



Anti-forensics

Vincent Liu och Patrick Stach

http://www.stachliu.com/research_conferences.html

Forensics and the future


http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/Anti-forensic_techniques

Anti-forensics (AF) I

- Various definitions
 - Attempts to negatively effect the existence, amount and/or quality of evidence from a crime scene
 - Or make the analysis and examination of evidence difficult or impossible to conduct
- Who uses it?
 - Hackers, dodgy employees, Al Qaeda, pedophiles, ...
- Attacks
 - The data, the tools, the analysts
- Forensic analysts have issues vs. criminals
 - Frequently short on time
 - Generally short on various skills as programming
 - Almost always slaves to their tools
 - Need to check *everything*

Anti-forensics (AF) II

- Forensic tools attacks
 - Implementation bugs
 - Find gaps in tool coverage
 - Trick the tools analysis
 - Counter Technique
 - Use different set of tools
- Disk and data wiping
 - Darik's Boot and Nuke (Dban), Active Killdisk etc.
 - Gutmann's method (old), Secure Erase Standard (HDDerase)
 - Commercial Tools
 - PGP Wipe, Evidence Eliminator, and a lot more...
 - Free Tools
 - Eraser, sdelete.exe, The Defiler's Toolkit (TDT)
 - Anti Forensic Tools
 - http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/Category:Anti-forensics_tools
 - Counter Technique
 - Analyze missed pieces




Anti-forensics (AF) III

- Data hiding (nothing new here!)
 - Rootkits have been around for quite some time
 - Attempt to hide data in unusual places
 - Memory – never written to disk
 - Slack space
 - Hidden directories/files
 - Alternate Data Streams
 - Hidden partitions
 - Modify file name/suffix and file header
 - Mix or embed files together
 - Steganography
 - Mixed results on identifying stego


Anti-forensics (AF) IV

- Hiding in file system metadata
 - Journal file, bad blocks or other special place
 - FragFS
 - Hides data within records of the NTFS Master File Table
 - Counter Technique
 - Detailed analysis of the empty metadata areas
 - Closer examination and interpretation of metadata by forensic tools




Anti-forensics (AF) V

- Data Encryption
 - Commercial quality free tools
 - TrueCrypt, GnuPG
 - Plausible deniability via hidden TrueCrypt volumes or hidden operating systems



- Counter Technique
 - Brute-force decryption
 - Look for stored passwords elsewhere
 - Key logging
 - Physical coercion to retrieve key



Anti-forensics (AF) VI

- Hiding in File Slack Space
 - Hiding data in the space between allocated and actual bytes in a file
 - Hidden data usually indistinguishable from old, overwritten files in slack
 - Slacker (NTFS/FAT) – part of MAFIA
 - Encryption, intelligent space selection
 - Bmap (ext2fs)
 - Counter Technique
 - Strings slack space
 - Statistical analysis of slack

#1 timestamps



- Technique
 - Timestamps hint as to when an event occurred
 - Timestamps help an analyst timeline events and profiling attackers behavior
 - If an investigator finds a suspicious file, they will search for other files with similar MAC attributes
- Anti-technique
 - Modify file times, log file entries, and create bogus and misleading timestamps
 - UNIX
 - touch command
 - Windows
 - FAT has MAC
 - Many tools exist
 - NTFS has MACE
 - Timestomp.exe – part of MAFIA

#1 timestamps



	Name	Last Accessed	File Created	Last Written	Entry Modified
<input type="checkbox"/> 210	Q329048.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/02/04 09:45:29AM	12/02/04 09:45:48AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 211	Q329115.log	07/11/05 04:48:15PM	12/11/04 11:15:20AM	12/11/04 11:15:23AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 212	Q329170.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/11/04 11:16:47AM	12/11/04 11:17:58AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 213	Q329390.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/11/04 11:15:08AM	12/11/04 11:15:10AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 214	Q329441.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/11/04 11:19:15AM	12/11/04 11:20:27AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 215	Q329834.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/11/04 11:33:43AM	12/11/04 11:33:48AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 216	Q329909.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/02/04 09:45:07AM	12/02/04 09:45:27AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 217	Q331953.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/02/04 09:43:34AM	12/02/04 09:43:55AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 218	Q810565.log	07/18/05 10:41:34PM	12/11/04 11:22:01AM	12/11/04 11:23:19AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 219	Q810577.log	07/11/05 05:13:54PM	12/11/04 11:29:32AM	12/11/04 11:30:44AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 220	Q810833.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/11/04 11:28:17AM	12/11/04 11:29:29AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 221	Q811630.log	07/11/05 09:32:26PM	12/11/04 11:25:51AM	12/11/04 11:26:57AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 222	Q811789.log	07/11/05 10:39:36PM	12/02/04 09:44:02AM	12/02/04 09:44:19AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 223	Q813862.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/02/04 09:46:57AM	12/02/04 09:47:17AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 224	Q814033.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/11/04 11:23:22AM	12/11/04 11:24:33AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM

- modified (M), accessed (A), created (C)
- entry modified (E) only NTFS



tool #1: timestomp

- TimeStomp <filename> [options]
 - <filename> the name of the file you wish to modify
 - -m <date> M, set the "last written" time of the file
 - -a <date> A, set the "last accessed" time of the file
 - -c <date> C, set the "created" time of the file
 - -e <date> E, set the "mft entry modified" time of the file
 - -z <date> set all four attributes (MACE) of the file
 - <date> "DayofWeek Month\Day\Year HH:MM:SS [AM|PM]"
- EnCase only uses the Standard Information Attribute (SI) (probably fixed by now?)
 - Given
 - The FileName Attribute (FN) MACE values are only updated when a file is created or moved
 - Therefore
 - FN MACE values must be older than SI MACE values

MFT Entry Header	SI Attribute MACE	FN Attribute MACE	Remaining Attributes...
-------------------------	------------------------------	------------------------------	--------------------------------

#2 location, location...



- Technique
 - Attackers tend to store tools in the same directory
- Anti-technique
 - Stop using %windir%\system32
 - Mix up storage locations both on a host and between multiple hosts
 - 3rd party software, browser temp, AV/spyware



#3 undelete

- Technique
 - Forensics tools will make a best effort to reconstruct deleted data
- Anti-technique
 - Secure file deletion
 - Filename, file data, MFT record entry
 - Wipe all slack space
 - Wipe all unallocated space
- Tools
 - SysInternals – sdelete.exe
 - Doesn't clean file slack space
 - Eraser (Heidi Computers)
 - Does clean file slack space



#4 signature analysis



- Technique
 - EnCase has two methods for identifying file types
 - File extension
 - File signatures
- Anti-technique
 - Change the file extension
 - Changing file signatures to avoid EnCase analysis

Foiling signature analysis



UltraEdit-32 - [C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\sdelete-modified]

File Edit Search Project View Format Column Macro Advanced Window Help

sdelete-modified

```
00000000h: 41 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00 AZ□.....ÿÿ..
00000010h: B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; .....@.....
00000020h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; .....
00000030h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 E0 00 00 00 ; .....à...
00000040h: 0E 1F BA 0E 00 B4 09 CD 21 B8 01 4C CD 21 54 68 ; ..°..'!Í!Th
00000050h: 69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F ; is program canno
00000060h: 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6E 20 69 6E 20 44 4F 53 20 ; t be run in DOS
00000070h: 6D 6F 64 65 2E 0D 0D 0A 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; mode....$.
00000080h: E1 69 CD AE A5 08 A3 FD A5 08 A3 FD A5 08 A3 FD ; áíí@¥.fý¥.fý¥.fý
00000090h: CA 17 A8 FD A4 08 A3 FD 26 14 AD FD B7 08 A3 FD ; Ê."ýα.fý&.-ý.fý
000000a0h: CA 17 A9 FD E7 08 A3 FD 26 00 FE FD A6 08 A3 FD ; Ê.©ýç.fý&.þý!.fý
000000b0h: A5 08 A2 FD 9A 08 A3 FD A3 2B A9 FD A4 08 A3 FD ; ¥.çýš.fýf+©ýα.fý
000000c0h: 62 0E A5 FD A4 08 A3 FD 52 69 63 68 A5 08 A3 FD ; b.¥ýα.fýRich¥.fý
000000d0h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; .....
000000e0h: 50 45 00 00 4C 01 04 00 71 AD 8E 3F 00 00 00 00 ; PE..L...q-Ž?....
000000f0h: 00 00 00 00 E0 00 0F 01 0B 01 06 00 00 80 00 00 ; .....à.....€..
00000100h: 00 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 7E 2D 00 00 00 10 00 00 ; .p.....~-.....
00000110h: 00 90 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 10 00 00 00 10 00 00 ; .□.....@.....
```

For Help, press F1

Pos: 0H, 0, C0

DOS

Mod: 7/23/2005 5:16:52PM

File Size: 61440

INS

...flip it and reverse it



• *tool #2*

• *transmogrify*

• *Does all the work*

• *Switch between multiple file formats*

• *exe, jpeg, pdf, gif, txt, and so on...*

• *Not released yet*

	Name	File Ext	File Type	Signature
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 21	textfile.exe	exe	Windows Executable	Match



#5 hashing

- Technique
 - To minimize search scope and analysis time
 - Create an MD5 fingerprint of all files on a system
 - Compare to lists of **known good** and **known bad** file hashes
- Anti-technique
 - Modify and recompile
 - Remove usage information
 - Stego works on non-executables as well as executables
 - Direct binary modification



#5 hashing

4a6579452b429670f920a546976822782b9203c3

-

```
; MZ.....ÿÿ..  
; ..@.....  
; .....  
; .....à...  
; ..°..'.'Í!..LÍ!Th  
; is program canno  
; t be run in DOS  
; mode.....$.....  
; áíÍ®¥.£ý¥.£ý¥.£ý  
; Ê."ý¤.£ý&.-ý°.£ý
```

od: 7/28/2005 10:15:54AM File Size: 61440 INS

fic

```
; MZ.....ÿÿ..  
; ..@.....  
; .....  
; .....à...  
; ..°..'.'Í!..LÍ!Th  
; is program canno  
; t be run on DOS  
; mode.....$.....  
; áíÍ®¥.£ý¥.£ý¥.£ý  
; Ê."ý¤.£ý&.-ý°.£ý
```

od: 7/27/2005 6:38:23PM File Size: 61440 INS

#6 keyword searching



- Technique
 - Analysts build lists of keywords and search through files, slack space, unallocated space, and pagefiles
- Anti-technique
 - Exploit the examiner's **lack of language skill**
- Opportunity for improvement
 - Predefined keyword lists in different languages

#7 reverse engineering



- Technique
 - 99% of examiners can't code
 - Possess rudimentary malware analysis skills if any
 - Binary compression (packer) identification
 - Commonly available unpackers
 - Run strings
 - Behavioral (dynamic) analysis
- Anti-technique
 - Use uncommon packers or create a custom loader
 - PEC2 - <http://www.bitsum.com/>
 - Packing strategy



#8 profiling



- Technique
 - Analysts find commonalities between: tools, toolkits, packers, language, location, timestamps, usage info, etc...
- Anti-technique
 - Use what's already in your environment

#9 information overload



- Technique
 - Forensics takes time – time is money
 - Businesses will have to make a judgment call of when to stop analysis
 - No pulling-the-plug. Business data takes priority
- Anti-technique
 - Make the investigation cost as much as possible (large drives, RAID, leave a mess)
 - “Help” the investigators
- Opportunity for improvement
 - Prioritize systems analysis
 - Automate analysis as much as possible

#10 hiding in memory



- Technique
 - EnCase Enterprise allows the examiner to see current processes, open ports, file system, etc...
- Anti-technique
 - Metasploit's Meterpreter (Reflective) DLL injection (never hit the disk)
 - Exploit a running process and create threads
- Opportunity for improvement
 - Capture what's in memory

Next Generation Tools

- Summaries for digital video files
 - Extraction of key frames
- Better image classification
 - Beyond hashing - feature identification (FTK4 - EID)
- Searching audio files for voice prints
- Generation of searchable text from audio files using speech recognition
- Automatic detection of steganography, malware etc.
- Background digital evidence preprocessing... (FTK2 >)
 - Analysis of evidence during pre-processing phase
 - Means...investigatory phase can start right away
- Extremely fast searches == uninterrupted brainstorming

Kom ihåg och dagens sanning

- Dokumentera
 - Man kommer inte komma ihåg allt
 - Kanske flera som utreder
 - Automatisera
 - Insamling och analys
 - Överdriv inte brottslingens kompetens
 - Oftast den enklaste förklaringen
 - Slipper gräva efter något som inte finns
 - **"I have no data yet. It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts."**
- Sherlock Holmes